I
IT IS impossible to study the works of the great mathematicians, or even those of the lesser, without noticing and distin guishing two opposite tendencies, or rather two entirely different kinds of minds. The one sort are above all preoccupied with logic; to read their works, one is tempted to believe they have advanced only step by step, after the manner of a Vauban who pushes on his trenches against the place besieged, leaving nothing to chance. The other sort are guided by intuition and at the first stroke make quick but sometimes precarious conquests, like bold cavalry men of the advance guard.
The method is not imposed by the matter treated. Though one often says of the first that they are analysts and calls the others geometers, that does not prevent the one sort from remaining analysts even when they work at geometry, while the others are still geometers even when they occupy themselves with pure analysis. It is the very nature of their mind which makes them logicians or intuitionalists, and they can not lay it aside when they approach a new subject.
Nor is it education which has devel oped in them one of the two tendencies and stifled the other. The mathematician is born, not made, and it seems he is born a geometer or an analyst. I should like to cite examples, and there are surely plenty; but to accentuate the contrast I shall begin with an extreme example, taking the liberty of seeking it in two living mathe maticians.
M. M?ray wants to prove that a bi nominal equation always has a root, or, in ordinary words, that an angle may always be subdivided. If there is any truth that we think we know by direct intuition, it is this. Who could doubt that an angle may always be divided into any number of equal parts? M. M?ray does not look at it that way; in his eyes this proposition is not at all evident and to prove it he needs several pages.
On the other hand, look at Professor Klein: he is studying one of the most ab stract questions of the theory of functions :
to determine whether on a given Riemann imagine a curve we can not represent it to ourselves without width; just so, when we represent to ourselves a straight line, we see it under the form of a rectilinear band of a certain breadth. We well know these lines have no width; we try to imagine them narrower and narrower and thus to approach the limit; so we do in a certain measure, but we shall never attain this limit. And then it is clear we can always picture these two narrow bands, one straight, one curved, in a position such that they encroach slightly one upon the other without crossing. We shall thus be led, unless warned by a rigorous analysis, to conclude that a curve always has a tangent.
I shall take as second example Dirichlet's principle on which rest so many theorems of mathematical physics; today we estab lish it by reasoning very rigorous but very long; heretofore, on the contrary, we were content with a very summary proof. A cer tain integral depending on an arbitrary function can never vanish. Hence it is con cluded that it must have a minimum. The flaw in this reasoning strikes us immedi ately, since we use the abstract term func tion and are familiar with all the singu larities functions can present when the word is understood in the most general sense.
But it would not be the same had we Intuition, therefore, does not give us certainty. This is why the evolution had to happen; let us now see how it happened.
It was not slow in being noticed that rigor could not be introduced in the rea soning unless first made to enter into the definitions. For the most part the objects treated of by mathematicians were long ill-defined; they were supposed to be known because represented by means of the senses or the imagination; but one had only a crude image of them and not a pre cise idea on which reasoning could take hold. It was there first that the logicians had to direct their efforts.
So, in the case of incommensurable numbers. The vague idea of continuity, which we owe to intuition, resolved itself into a complicated system of inequalities referring to whole numbers.
By that means the difficulties arising from passing to the limit, or from the con sideration of infinitesimals, are finally re moved. Today in analysis only whole num bers are left or systems, finite or infinite, of whole numbers bound together by a net of equality or inequality relations.
Mathematics, as they say, is arithmetized.
Ill
A first question presents itself. Is this evolution ended? Have we finally attained absolute rigor? At each stage of the evolu tion our fathers also thought they had reached it. If they deceived themselves, do we not likewise cheat ourselves?
We believe that in our reasonings we no longer appeal to intuition ; the philosophers will tell us this is an illusion. Pure logic could never lead us to anything but tau tologies; it could create nothing new; not from it alone can any science issue. In one sense these philosophers are right ; to make arithmetic, as to make geometry, or to make any science, something else than pure logic is necessary. To designate this something else we have no word other than intuition. But how many different ideas are hidden under this same word?
Compare these four axioms:
(1) Two quantities equal to a third are equal to one another; (2) if a theorem is true of the number 1 and if we prove that it is true of + 1 if true for n, then will it be true of all whole numbers; (3) if on a straight the point C is between A and and the point D between A and C, then the point D will be between A and B; (4) through a given point there is not more than one parallel to a given straight.
All four are attributed to intuition, and yet the first is the enunciation of one of the rules of formal logic; the second is a real synthetic a priori judgment, it is the foun dation of rigorous mathematical induction ; the third is an appeal to the imagination; the fourth is a disguised definition. It is the intuition of pure number, that of pure logical forms, which illumines and directs those we have called analysts. This it is which enables them not alone to demonstrate, but also to invent. By it they perceive at a glance the general plan of a logical edifice, and that too without the senses appearing to intervene. In rejecting the aid of the imagination, which, as we have seen, is not always infallible, they can advance without fear of deceiving themselves. Happy, therefore, are those who can do without this aid! We must admire them; but how rare they are! Among the analysts there will then be inventors, but they will be few. The ma Classics in mathematics educationjority of us, if we wished to see afar by pure intuition alone, would soon feel our selves seized with vertigo. Our weakness has need of a staff more solid, and, despite the exceptions of which we have just spoken, it is none the less true that sensi ble intuition is in mathematics the most usual instrument of invention. 
